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IN THE SUPREME COU.RT 
of the 
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Defendant Byron Davies, hereinafter referred to as 
~~ r. DaviP~, agrees \vith thP statement of facts contained 
in plaintiffs' brief but notes certain additions thereto. 
~Ir. Davil's' rlailn for occupational disease, dated 
~larch S, 1962, \vas filed "Tith the Industrial Comn:P.ssion 
on .A.pril 9, lDti~. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
BYRON DAVIES FILED HIS CLAIM FOR TOTAL DIS-
ABILITY RESULTING FROM AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 
WITH!~ THE TIME REQUIRED BY SECTION 35-2-48(a) 
tCA 1953. 
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2 
'The difficulty defendants see with plaintiffs' posi-
tion is an unwillingness to differentiate bet\\reen symp-
toms of silicosis and disability due to silicosis. '"" e think 
it only fair to state that those employed in the mining 
industry are well aware that continuous exposure to 
harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust will cause 
silicosis. 
The Legislature has seen fit, however. to award 
compensation only for disability, not the symptoms. 
Section 35-2-13 UCA 1953 is quoted in part: 
"35-2-13. EMPLO·YER LIABILITY FOR 
COMPENSATION - CONDITIONS WHEN 
NO PAYMENT TO BE PAID.- (a) There is 
imposed upon every employer a liability for the 
payment of compensation to every employee who 
becomes totally disabled by reason of an occupa-
tional disease subject to the following conditions: 
"(1) No compensation shall be paid when 
the last day of injurious exposure of the employee 
to the hazards of said occupational disease shall 
have occurred prior to the effective date of this 
act. 
" ( 3) No compensation shall be paid in case 
of silicosis unless during the fifteen years immed-
iately preceding the disablement, the injured 
employee shall have been exposed to harmful 
quantities of silicon dioxide (Si02) dust for a 
total period of not less than five years in this state 
and unless total disability results within: (a) two 
years in case of silicosis not complicated by act~ve 
tuberculosis, . . from the last day upon wh1ch 
the employee actually worked for the employer 
against whom compensation is claimed." (Empha-
sis added) 
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Since Mr. Davies last actually worked for American 
Mud & ChPntieal Contpany through December 31, 1960, 
in ordPr to have cause of action his total disability must 
rP~Ult \rithin t\\·o yPars of that date, or December 30, 
1962, unless complicated by tuberculosis, when total 
disability must result within five years. 
It is true that an employee rnust file his clairn within 
the time provided in 35-2-13 ( 4), UCA 1953, which section 
is as follows : 
H ( 4) No claim shall be maintained nor com-
pensation paid unless the claim has been filed 
with the commission in writing within the time 
fixed by the appropriate subdivision of ~Section 
35-2-48." 
SPetion 35-2-48 UCA 1953 provides: 
"The right to compensation under this act 
for disability or death from an occupational dis-
ease shall be forever barred unless written claim 
is filed with the commission within the time as in 
this section hereinafter provided : 
''(a) If the claim is made by an empl9yee and 
based upon silicosis it must be filed within one 
year after the cause of action arises." · 
The question is, when did Mr. Davies' claim for 
total disability arise1 It is readily apparent that under 
a fair interpretation of the foregoing provisions, it is 
possible that an employee such as Mr. Davies could: 
(1) terminate his employment as of December 31, 1960; 
(2) become totally disabled on December 30, 1962; (3) 
file his claim on December 29, 1963 ; and still have a valid 
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4 
claim against the "employer in \\Those e1nploy1uent the 
employee was last exposed to harmful quantities of 
silicon dioxide (Si02) dust during a period of thirty 
days or more after the effective date of this aet." 
35~2-14 UCA 1953. 
Was Mr. Davies totally disabled fro1n silicosis 'vhen 
examined by Dr. J. D. Mortensen on June 13, 1960? 
Dr. M.ortensen's conclusions (R-127, 128) are as follows: 
"Q. All right. Doctor, I may have interrup-
ted your train of thought, but let me ask you what 
was your final diagnosis as a result of the hos-
pitilization tests~ Or did you 1nake any further 
tests, or examinations~ 
"A. No. I just concluded - put all this to-
gether and made conclusions - and \vrote a letter 
to Dr. Masin summarizing my findings and con-
clusions, and talked with Mr. Davies and reported 
to him my findings and conclusions. I felt that 
this man - We had positive evidence that he had 
advanced silicosis, and that he also had diffuse 
bronchitis. I felt that his pttlmonary function test 
had indicated his silicosis was not at that time 
disabling, but that he was limited in activity 
because of bronchitis. (E.mphasis ours.) I pre-
scribed inhalations of nebuperal ( ~) and neomy-
cin, asked him to take antibiotics for his bronch-
itis, reassured him about the absence of tu~or 
or tuberculosis or other infections, and asked hun 
to keep in close touch 'vith his doctor for manage-
ment of his chronic bronchitis and weight 
problems." 
Dr. Mortensen indicates, that because of bronchitis, 
overweight and silicosis, Mr. Davies would be limited 
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in his plty~i<'al a~tivitiP~ at least 30)'~ at that tin1e, 
<·otnpurecl to a nor·n•altnan of his age. (R-128, 129). 
~'lr. Davil 1 S r(•t urned to his regular occupation, 
t·ont inuPd his regular dutiP~, at his regular salary until 
the opt·rat ion "·as closed down because of the dust 
hnzard, as of DPePill her 3/1 1960. ( R-68) In November 
and DPet'tnber of 1961, l\lr. Davies did work as a · con-
~ulting geologist, (R-~7) and received the sum of $500.00 
for his \rork. (l{.-~8, -!9, 69, 70 and 71). 
\\'"as ~lr. Davies totally disabled as a matter of law 
in XoYelnber and December of 1961 ~ Section 35-2-12 
UC1\ l~)~l~), defining terms, is of assistance here and 
the portions covering ''total disability" and "partial 
per1nanent disability" are set forth as follows: 
"35-2-12. CONSTRUC'TION OF TERMS. -
rrhe following terms as used in this act shall be 
construed as follows: 
" (a) 'Disablement' means the event of be-
coining physically incapacitated by reason of an 
occupational disease as defined in this act from 
performing any \Vork for remuneration or profit. 
Silicosis, as defined in this act, when complicated 
by active puhnonary tuberculosis, shall be pre-
suined to be total disablenient. 'Disability,' 'dis-
abled,' total disability,' or totally disabled' shall 
be synonymous 'vith 'disablement,' but they shall 
have no reference to 'partial permanent disabil-
·ty' 1 • 
" (e) 'Partial permanent disability,' as herein 
used, is defined as that pathological condition di-
rectly resulting from -an occupational disease and 
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causing substantial physical irnpairment, evi-
denced by objective medical and clinical findings 
readily demonstrable, and which has reduced the 
earning capacity of the employee, excluding, 
however, total disability cases." 
Applying the definitions to the facts of the instant 
case, we believe that Mr. Davies was probably "partially 
permanently disabled" during the period of November-
December 1961, because there is "substantial physical 
impairment" which has reduced the earning capacity 
of the employee. However, as a Inatter of law, he was 
not "totally disabled" at this time because he was 
"performing work for remuneration or profit." Although 
he was not performing labor in the sense of manual labor 
requiring great physical exertion, it is "any work for 
remuneration or profit," which is the test of the statute. 
Had the commission determined Mr. Davies to be totally 
disabled at this time, this court might well reverse the 
commission as a matter of law. 
Mr. Davies filed his application for disability on 
April 9, 1962; within four months of the time he last 
performed work for remuneraton or profit, to-wit, Nov-
ember-December of 1961. 
When did Mr. Davies become totally disabled f It 
was the opinion of the three member chest panel, appoint-
ed by the Industrial Commission and consisting of spe-
cialists Drs. Kilpatrick, Moffat and Waldo, that Mr. 
Davies was totally disabled as of June 16, 1962. This 
date is within two years from the last day upon which 
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tht- einployt~e actually \Vorked for the e1nployer against 
whorn t·otnpensation is clairned, to-,vit, December 31, 1960. 
1r ndPr the facts of this case, it is difficult to see how 
a findin~ of partial disability in l\Ir. Daves could be 
:-;u:-;taitu·d prior to DPePHtber 31, 1960 under the provi-
:-;iuns or ;~~>-:2-1~ ( t'). Syn1ptornatically, he demonstrated 
:-;ilieo~i~ yet there \Yas no reduction in his earning capa-
city prior to thi~ date. 
This court is no doubt familiar with the cases where-
in tht• e1nployee and the employer are both aware of the 
~ilicotic condition developing in the employee. The 
t'tnploype is then taken out of underground or. exposure 
type employment and is placed in other employme~t 
whPrein the e1nployee continues to work until disability 
finally occurs. See Pacific Employers Insuranc-e. Co. 
v. Industrial Commission, 108 Utah 123, 157. P 2d 800.; 
Pacific Employers Insurance Company v. In£1u$triql 
Conunissiou, 115 Utah 451, 205 P 2d 829. To apply the 
reasoning of the plaintiffs to these situatio:q.s, an em-
ployee would be barred by a one year statute of limita-
tion eonunencing at the time he knew he ·had silicosis, 
regardless of the fact that he continues in gainful em'-
ployment and suffers no reduction in his e·arning capa~ 
city. The un\vorkability of such an approach iS:-.r~adily 
apparent. The filing of a claiJ:n for disability due t9 
• J ·' 
silicosis results in a termination of employment. 
Defendants have no quarrel with the doctrines laid 
do,vn in the cases of Jlarsh v. Industrial Accident Com-
miss iO'n, 217 Cal. 338, 18 P 2d · 933; or· St,ate I nsuranee 
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Fund v. Industrial Commission, 116 Utah 279, 209 P 2d 
553. The quoted portion of the latter case in the 
plaintffs' brief is illustrative : 
"The better rule which is in accord with 
reason and justice, is that a cause of action does 
not arise until an ascertainable disability and 
compensable disability results." (Emphasis 
added.) 
!The disability must be ascertainable and compens-
able, and there can be no compensation for total disability 
when the employee is performing work for remuneration 
or profit. Total disability is a mixed question of fact and 
law. It cannot be subjectively determined by the em-
ployee. ·This determination is made by the Industrial 
Commission based upon the Report of the Medical 
Panel (R-19), as provided in 35-2-56 U·CA 1953, and on 
other competent evidence contained in the record. 
The Commission found that Mr. Davies performed 
work for remuneration or profit in the capacity of a 
consulting geologist and earned the sum of $500.00, 
between November 15 and December 31, 1961. The com-
mission also adopted the Medical Panel's finding that 
employee was totally disabled as of June 15, 1962 (R-
153). 
We submit that the application filed April 9, 1962 
within four months of Mr. Davies' last work for remun-
eration or profit, is within time. 
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CONCLUSION . · 
For t hP foregoing reasons, the Order of the Indus-~ 
trial Con1n1ission dated November 18, 1963, awarding-Mr. 
Davies co1npensation for total disability should be af-
firmed. 
Respectfully submitted, · 
BRAYTON, LOWE & HURLEY 
ANDRE.W R. HURLEY - . 
1001-5 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah - · 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Received a copy of the foregoing Brief this·------~-------­
day of July, 1964. 
-.------. -- ----.. -------------.. --~--- ----- ~-- .. ----------- -------------.. - . 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
